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THE RHETORIC OF FRIEDMAN'S QUANTITY THEORY MANIFESTO
THOMAS MAYER* 1-riedman's (1956) essay "The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement" that appeared as the first chapter of his Studies in the Quanti,fy 7;"leory of Money set the agenda for a substantial part of the macroeconomic debate of the 1960s and 1970s. Laidler (1994, p. 4) refers to it as marking the beginning of the "Monetarist episode", even though it deals only with one part of the monetarist paradigm. Although in subsequent years Friedman wrote much on the quantity theory, this paper remains his best exposition of it. It is superior to his more detailed 1970 exposition because here, in c:ontrast to his 1970 paper, he employs a theoretical framework that is congenial to him. and also because it is more closely related to his subsequent empirical work. l Its importance for the history of monetary thec y is not the only reason this paper deserves ztudy. Another is its expository technique. Friedman is one of the most accomplished expositors of our profession. A study of his rhetclric may therefore teach the rest of us how to present our work His I956 paper is a particularly good example of his rhetorical skills because, as discused below.
ivriti~ig it presented an unusually challenging rhetorical task.
A third reason for studying Friedman's rhetoric is to elucidate the rhetoric of economics. Thus IvlcCloskey (1985) has argued that we will become better economists if we understand what xguments persuade us and why. Robert Solow (1988) . too. sees nothing but good coming from the ! tudy of how economists persuade each other. It is therefore not surprising that the rhetoric of i:conomics has become a flourishing subfield. McCloskey (1994) list sixty-eight books and papers 1)ublished in the period 1982 to 1994 that are concerned with the rhetoric of economics, though many o t them deal with this topic only peripherally. This is not the first study of Friedman's rhetoric. Harry Johnson (1971) has studied the rhetoric and strategy of both the Keynesian and monetarist revolutions, and has much to say that is -elevant for Friedman's I956 essay. And so does a recent paper by Roger Backhouse (1994). Both ;ire discussed below.
It should be obvious that I am using the term rhetoric not in the pejorative sense of a shell game or an exposition that, while superficially persuasive is fundamentally flawed. Instead. L follow McCloskey (I985 p. 29) who defined rhetoric as "the art of speaking (or1 . . . the study of how people persuade", atid hence as a basic component of good science. All sciences, including mathematics (see Davis and Hersch. 1987 ) use rhetoric. As John Campbell (1987, p. 69) in his study of Darwin's rhetoric remarked: "Even scientific discoilrse must be persuasive to rescue insight from indifference, misunderstanding. contempt, or rejection." In this spirit when 1 suggest belou that Friedman presented his argument in a certain way because that was an effective rhetorical device, I am not accusing him of departing from the highest standards of intellectual integrity. As long as one does not use an argument that one knows, or should know, to be flawed, it is entirely appropriate, and indeed an aid to the reader, to use that argument and exposition that will prove most effective. Moreover, I am not implying that Friedman consciously employed a certain mode of exposition because it is good rhetoric. A brilliant ex~csitor can do that without being aware of it I . The Hegemony of Keynesian Theory For two or three decades following the publication of Keynes' (1936) General Theon. the quantity theory was usually treated as an outmoded approach.7 Ac Laldler (1991, pp. 291-92) reports: "Ar no time in history was the quantity theory in greater disrepute than in the two decades following the second World War." Thus in 1951 Seymour Harris (p. 183) wrote that the relegation of monetary policy: "to a secondary role resls not only on history but also on the development of Keynesian economics. It is increasingly iashionable to attack the problem [of excess demand] through fiscal policy." Similarly, Lawrence Ritter (1959 p. 120) pomted out that: "the view has been w~dely expressed that anti-inflationary monetary policy is unlikely to be successful because of offsetting movements in velocity." Alvin Hansen (1957, p. SO) , who was widely considered the leading Amer~can macro-economist of his generation wrote that: I think we should do well to eliminate once and for all, the phrase 'velocity of circulation' from our vccabulary. Instead, we should simply speak of the ratio ot money to aggregate spending. The phrase ~jelocity of circulation is, I feel, unforrunate because those who employ it tend to make an independent entity out of it and imbue it with a soul. 'The little manikin is placed on the stage, and the audience is led to believe that it is endowed with the power of making decisions directing and controlling the flow of aggregate spending. In fact it is nothing of the sort. It is a mere residual. We should get on much better if we substitute the word 'ratio'. Thr: little manikin would then be forced back into oblivion where it properly belongs.
Similarly, in Britain the Radcliffe Committee stated:
We have not made more use of this concept [velocityj because we cannot find any reason for supposing, or any experience in monetary history indicating, that there is any limit to the velocity of circulation: it is a statistical concept that tells us nothing directly of the motivation that influences the level of total demand. (Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 1959, p. 133.) By no means all economists went that far, and many did important work on the demand for money and velocity. Thus William Baumol (1952) and James Tobin (1956 Tobin ( . 1958 ) developed models of the transactions and precautionary demands for money, while other economists did txtensive empirical work on the demand for money. (See for instance. Doblin, 1951 : Garvey 959: Tobin. 1947 .) Moreover, in 1952 many prominent economisrs signed a statement, which while hardly a ringing affirmation of the quantity theory, did give some role to the quantity of money: "The amount that individuals and businesses desire to spend is powerfully influenced both tly the volume of credit that is available to them and by the volume of money and other liquid ;sets that they already possess." (P,nonymous, 1952) And in the same year as Friedman's essay there appeared Don Patinkin's (19515) classic reworking of the qua~itity theory and of monetary theory in general. Moreover. as Johnson (1971) has pointed out the standard IS-LM model seems to imply a stable demand function tbr money.
But even those who considered the money demand function worth investigating, and allowed a certain role for monetary policy, generally did so within a Keynesian framework in which the supply of money is simply one of several variables that determine money income, and is far fron~ t~eing the most important one.
Such a strong conviction that the quantity theory was an outmoded theory presented Friedman with a difficult task. And so did the fact that as Laidler (1991) has pointed out, debates about ihe quantity theory have a strong ideological element. This makes it hard to persuade those on the other side of the debate. Moreover. many economists were skeptical of any work originating in the (-hicago economics department, because they rejected its laissez-faire tradition.
. Methodology
In his attack on the well entrenched Keynesian consensus (also called the neo-classical synthesis)
Friedman greatly benefitted from a change in the profession's methodological preferences, a change for which he himself was in large part responsible. Three years earlier in his famous methodological paper (Friedman. 1953) he had argued that theories should be evaluated primarily by their ability to predict, and no[: by the realism of their assumptions, or by their descriptive realism or by their concordance with personal experiences and similar types of casual empiricism.
(See Hirsch and de Marchi. 1990 .) Although Friedman's methodological essay has been much criticized by professional methodologists, it has had great appeal to other economists. (See Boland. 1979. p. 503) This new methodology helpe8d Friedman to build a case against the Keynesian consensus in several ways. First, any change im the methodological criteria for evaluating theories iinplic~tly calls into question the validity of theories, such as Keynesian theory, that had been accepted on the basis of the previous criteria. Second, Keynesian theory had had an advantage over the quantity theory because its assumptions seem more realistic. The assumprions of [he popular Keynesian mulriplier-accelerator model. thar consumption depends on income and investment depends on die change in sales. seem highly credible. More generally. since most economists themselves are i~ot severely capital rationed. it may :seem natural to them that expenditures depend more on income than on money holdings. But Friedman's new methodology allowed him to shift the focus of the discussion from such casual cmp:ricisni and emphasis on assumptions to the question of how well the theory predicts. On this he could point to the empirical chapters of the book that. on the whole. offered successful predictions based on the quantity theory. Moreover, he could use his "as if" methodology to counter the complaint that the quantity theory is a "black box" that does not 3 explain in nearly as much detail as the Keynesian theory. just how and why income changes. (Set Johnson. 1971) Backhouse (1994) legitimately discuss a general approach rather than a testable theory. and can present its conclusions in the form of opinions. Moreover. while an introductory chapter will often indicate the predicribe capability and fruitfulness of the theory by summarizing the results shown in subsequent chaptersand Friedman does that -it will typically not present compelling evidence on these issues. It is also common for an introductory chapter to devote considerable space to the theory's provenance.
Friedman's Response to the Challenge
Despite the just discussed methodological advantage Friedman faced a daunting task in trying to induce economists to relinquish the Keynesian consensus, and to return to a theoretical approach which most of them had previously abandoned. His initial objective was therefore not to convince his readers that the quantity theory is necessarily correct. but that it is a theory that tnight be worth reconsidering. so that his paper is worth taking seriously.
One possible way to induce readers to reconsider a theory they had previously rejected, is to tell them right at outset that what they will find presented here is something that differs sharply from the old, stale doctrine that they had previously rejected. Hence, they can accept the new theory without incurring the embarrassment of having to admit thht they had made a m~stake when they previously rejected the quantity theory. Friedman does this by starting his essay as follows:
The quantity theory of money is a term evocative of a general approach rather than a label for a well-defined theory. The exact content of the approach varies from a truism defining the term "velocity" to an allegedly rigid and unchanging ratio between the quantity of money -defined in one way or another -and the price level ... [I] t is clear that the general approach [of the quantity theory] fell into disrepute ... and only recently has been slowly re-emerging into professional respectability. The present volume is partly a symptom of this re-emergence and partly a continuation of an aberrant tradition. Chicago was one of the few academic centers at which the quantity theory continued to be a central and vigorous part of the oral tradition. ... The quantity theory that retained this role differed sharply from the atrophied and rigid caricature that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure approach -and with some justice to judge by the much of the literature on policy that was spawned by quantity theorists. ...
[N]o systematic statement of this theory as developed at Chicago exists. ... And this is as it should be, for the Chicago tradition was not a rigid system, an unchanged orthodoxy, but a way of looking at things. It was a theoretical approach that insisted that money does matter -that any interpretation of short-term movements in economic activity is likely to be seriously at fault if it neglects monetary changes and repercussions and if it leaves unexplained why people are willing to hold the particular nominal quantity of money in existence. The purpose of this introduction is nor to enshrine -or should I say inter -a definitive version of the Chicago tradition. (Friedman. 1956, p. 3) This passage has been much criticized. Don Patinkin (1972 Patinkin ( , 1981 . Chapters 10 and 1 1 ) and Harry Johnson ( 1 962) argue persuasively that the theory that Friedman presents differs sharply from what had been taught at Chicago, and instead has Keynesian origins. In 1964 Friedman himself acknowledged a strong Keynesian influent,: on his formulation of the money demand function (Friedman. 1964) . Even so, he maintains that it should be considered a development of the Ch~cago tradition. (See Friedman. 1972: and alw Parkin. 1986 ) Others have crituzed the above-clted passage because Friedman ignored work on the quantity theory done outside Chicago (See Humphrey, 1971; 1973; Tavlas, 1976 : Patinkin, 1981 , 1981 Laidler, 1993.) A complication is that. as Tavlas (1997) points out. leading Chicago economists advocated public works expenditures as a way of getting additional money into circulation, thus advocating "Keynesian" policy for quantity-theory reasons. Despite these complexities I will refer to Fr~edman's theory as a quantity theory. in part because that need not imply that his essay is necessarily in the Chicago tradition, and in part because that is the phrase customarily used to descnbe his theory Apart from the disputed issue of paternity a major (and entirely legitimate) purpose of this passage seems to be to shake the confidence of the reader in the belief that she already know all she need to know about the quantity theory to be able to reject it.4 So Friedman emphasizes that t h~. quantity theory is a broad approach, a way of looking at the macro economy and not a specific model that the reader previously repted. To stress the difference between his approach and what one might call the naive version of the quantity theory Friednian writes that he accepts three :standard and telling criticisms of the naive version: that it confuses the quantity theory, which is an f:mpirical theory, with the MV=PT identity, that it claims that velocity is numerically stable (a (:laim strongly rejected by the data during the Grea: Depression and World War II), and that it ignores the problem of defining money. By telling the reader: "yes, you are right to have rejected for these reasons the 'atrophied and rigid' version of the quantity theory," Friedman tells him that he is on his side. Moreover, by saying that the quantity theory is now re-emerging Friedman is sending a warning to any readers who might want to make herself seem up to date by disparaging the quantity theory.
Friedman's description of the (Chicago quantity theory not as a finished theory, but as an evolving research program not only helps to overcome the natural reluctance to reconsider what one had previously rejected. but has an additional rhetorical advantage: it makes the theory look like a source of substantial research opportunities. And so does the inclusion in the book of four significant empirical studies. One need not be entirely committed to a public choice theorv of academia to conclude that a belief that a theory can be used to generate numerous papers makes that theory attractive to academics. In addition, as Johnson (1971 ) has pointed out. Friedman's analysis implies a shift of the research agenda away from large econometric models. That made the quantity theory appealing to young economists who can work on such models only as junior members of a team.
The disparaging tone of Friedman's discussion of the policy recommendations spawned by quantity theorists outside Chicago, while unfair to these quantity theorists, could also be expected to make the quantity theory attractive to most economist^.^ It is a commonplace that part of thr enthusiasm for Keynesian theory in the 1930s and in the early postwar period was due to it providing intellectual support for policies that many economists found attractive for other reasons.
Finally, by describing the quantity theory broadly as: "a theoretical approach that insisted that money does matter" and as an insistence on analyzing equilibrium in the market for money.
Friedman makes it difficult for readers to say thct they reject the quantity theory. A subtle shit't of focus accomplishes this task. A typical Keynesian of, say 1950 vintage would not deny that the money market must equilibriate, but would argue that as an empirical matter the effect of a change in the money supply on nominal Income is very small, and that most of the observed changes in nominal income are the due to other factors. Reestablishing equilibrium in the money market even in the face of a substantial increase in the money supply results in only very small increase in income, because of a highly interest elastic demand for money and a highly interest inelastic marginal efficiency of investment. By stating -at an abstract level a basic principle of economicsthat the money market must be in equilibrium for iicome to be at its equilibrium level, Friednlan by-passes this response, and induces the reader to be receptive to his message. that was not how he thought of it at the time he wrote his essay, and he did not w,nt to sail under false color^.^ Another possibility is that he was influenced by a sense of loyalty to his Chicago teachers and colleagues A third possibility is that, as Johnson (1971) has suggested, in presenting a seemingly new theory it helps to absorb the valid parts of the old thzory under "confusing new names". How plausible is this explanation? It is true that by making the demand for money a function of the interest rate the other Keynesian variables are allowed to enter by the back door, something that Furthermore, Friedman's metliodological preference is to evaluate theories by testing their central implications. He therefore preferred to test his theory not by testing assumptions about elasticities, but by the success his students had had in using it to explain a wide variety of events.
Besides. Friedman is uncomfortable working with the simplistic IS-LM model that underlies tht:
interest-elasticities approach. 10
. Friedman's Portfolio Analysis
Friedman devotes about half his essay to developing the microfoundations for his money demand function, thus answering the objection that the quantity theory is mechanistic. that it reads as though money has a velocity of circulation that is independent of human volition and maximizing behavior. l 1 These microfoundations brought the quantity theory up-to-date. It is true they wen: nut rigorous enough to satisfy all economists (see Habn, 1958) . or nearly as elaborate and rigorous as those provided by Patinkin in the same year, nor would they be considered adequate by the prevailing standards of the 1990s.12 But in the 1950s they did show that the quantity theory was a theory capable of sufficient r e f i~~e n~e n t , and not just a vague common sense rationalization of some observed correlations.
By presenting his portfolio theory in ,om( detail Friedman gained another. though perhaps unintciided advantage. As h? points out: "Almost every economist will accept the general lines 01'
.. . lrhis] analysis on a purely formal and abstract level" (Friedman. 1956, p. 15) . With a large part of the essay thus being unconrroversial Friedman reduces some readers' potential feelings of antagonism to a paper by a Chicago economist who is advocating an "old fashioned" theory that has the unpleasant policy implication that fiscal policy is ineffective.
Friedman commences his portfolio analysis with a point that though obvious by hindsight had been largely ignored and that sets the stage for his detailed portfolio analysis: Since money is a capital good that provides a flow of services, the theory ot dzina~id for money can be subsurnt:d under the general theory of demand for capital goods. This implies that one should be loath to talk about velocity being stable because payment habits and customs are stable. Habits and customs relating to transportation are also stable, but economists analyze the demand for cars by looking at relative prices and incume.
Friedtnan then introduces an innovation derived from his work on the permanent income theory. This is to expand the traditional concept of wealth to include human wealth. so that, i v e n the rate of interest it is arbitrary whether one uses wealth or income as the budget constraint.
Although this is hardly a matter of great importance for the quantity theory. it is an elegant point likely to make readers appreciate the essay. 13 Iknowing the quantity of money does nor allow one to determine the equilibrium level of income ~n l e s s one also knows the structure of interest rates and the level of real income.
In the following passage Friedman (1956. p. 15) explains, in anticipation of his work on the "missing equation" (Friedman. 1970) . that: Even under the most favorable conditions, for example :hat the demand for money is quite inelastic with respect to the variables in v, equation ... [(2)1 zives at most a theory of money income". a n i does not tell us the breakdown of this change xtween prices and real income. AI. tirst glance the presence of the phrase "at most" is surprrsing.
But it is needed to deal wirli a complication. Except in the special case in which the real income :lasticity of demand for money is unity. when the quantity of money rises the increase in nominal Income required to restore equilibrium depends upon the breakdown of this increase in nominal income between prices and real income. l4 By saying "at most" Friedman protects himself from rhe criticism that he has ignored a significant difficulty for the quantity theory, without having to take up a complication that reduces the quantity theory's ability to predict nominal i n c o n~e . '~ 6. What Distinguishes the Quantity Theory from Keynesian Theory?
Since the portfolio theory that makes up such a large part of the essay is essentially uncontroversial
Friedman then asks what it means to say that somebody rejects the quantity theory. He mentions three points of contention between quantity theorists and Keynesians: "(i) the stability and importance of the demand function for money; (ii) the independence of the factors affecting demand and supply: and (iii) the form of the demand function or related functions.'' (Friedman, 1956 . p. 15). He does not discuss explicitly two other disagreements.
One, which later played a central role in his debate with his critics (Friedman, 1972) Implicitly, however, the choice between Keynesian and quantity-theory research strategies shows up twice in Friedman's essay. One instance is that:
The quantity theorist not only regards the demand function for money as stable: he also regards it as playing a vital role in determining variables that he considers of great importance . . . . It is this that leads him to put greater emphasis on the demand for money than on, let us say. the demand for pins, even though the latter might be as stable as the former. It is not easy to state this point precisely, and I cannot pretend to have done so. (Friedman, 1956. p. 16) Although. as Friedman says,, it may be hard to state preciselv, the general ideas that monel unlike pins directly enters every market. and that wages and prices are set in money terms. are points that the reader should find obvious and uncontroversial -unlike the idea that one can predict nominal income better by looking at the money supply than by looking at the standard Keynesian variables. The other place is Friedman's claim that the empirical studies included in his book show how fruitfully the quantity theory can be applied to macroeconomic problems.
On the first point of the three points of contention that he does take up Friedman (1956, p. 16) compares the quantity theorists' belief that the demand for money is stable with the belief that:
"The demand for money ... is a will-0'-the wisp, shifting erratically and unpredictably with every rumor and expectation. simplifies the exposition, and avoids the need to defend the quantity theory at an addition point. a point at which it would have been hard to obtain convincing evidence either way.
The secoltd point of contentison relates to an ' s u e that would later become central to the monetarist debate. the direction of causation between money and income. (See Hammond. 1996b .)
Friedman takes a moderate position. claiming only that causation runs from money to income some "there are important factors affecting the supply of money that do not affect the demand for money. Under some circumstances these are technical conditions affecting the supply of specie: under others. political and psychological conditions determining the policies of monetary authorities and the banking system. (Friedman, 1956, p. 16.) He then describes the real bills doctrine as "the classic version of the objection" to the quantity theory on the issue of d~rection of causation. l 6 In calling the real bills doctrine the classic objection Friedman is correct. and he also gains a rhetorical point. since the real bills doctrine is in very bad repute among monetary economists. But this is so mainly because of its normative element -that the money supply sllould change to accommodate changes in the demand for money rather than its prediction of how the money supply does behave. Hence reference to the real bills doctrine should not be considered a sufficient answer to the "reverse-causation" criticism.
Moreover. the casual reader may confuse the "classic objection" with the strongest objection, and thus obtain a misleading impression of the seriousness of the reverse-causation problem.
However, Friedman does riot dismiss this problem merely by referring to the real bills doctrine. but goes on to say that there are important determinants of the money supply that arc independent of the demand for money. This makes it possible -for specific cases in which these determinants can be snown to operate t o test, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) subsequently did.
the quantity-theory hypothesis that when the money supply changes nominal income changes in a predictable way. But it does not provide a justification for a much stronger quantity-theory hypothesis: that most of the observed changes in nominal income are due to exogenous changes in the money supply. And it does not justify the practice, so common in the 1960s and 1970s. of interpreting a good fit in a regression of income on the money supply as a confirmation of the quantity theory. While Friedman does not deny that, it is something that a hasty reader of his essay may overlook
Friedman's third point of contention is the slope of the liquidity preference function
The attack on the quantity theory a,sociated with the Keynesian underemployment analysis is . . . [that the] demand for money, it is said, is infinitely elastic at a "small" positive interest rate. At this interest rate, which can be expected to prevail under under-employ men^: conditions, chmges in the real supply of money . . . have no effect on anything. (Friedman, 1956, p. 17.) This is a point where Friedm,an's rhetoric is bad because he does not state his argument clearly and unambiguously. On the one hand, the just cited passage could be read simply as a descriptive statement about what Keynesians believe (or perhaps what Keynes himself believed in 1936).
without this being a necessary condition for the validity of Keynesian theory. If this is all that Friedman intends it is puzzling why he singled it out as one of three points of contention.
Alternatively, because of the prominent position that Friedman gives it, one m~ght read it as meaning that unless the interest elasticity of demand for money is infinite Keynesian theory is invalid. But if that is what he inte:nds, how can he expect the reader to understand this argument without detailed explanation? In a classic paper Tobin (1947) had argued that the quantity theory (classical economics) is valid if. and only if, the demands for money is completely interest inelastic, while Keynesian theory is valid both if the demand for money is infinitely elastic and it' it has a finite, but nonzero (negative) elasticity. Friedman should have expected many, of his readers to be familiar with Tobin's position and to have accepted it. Yet he does not offer an explicit response, such as Tobin's failure to take price changes and wealth effects into account. He should therefore have expected that readers would find his position puzzling rather than persuasive.
Why then did he not explain his position? One can only conjecture. One possibility is that he
had not yet worked out sufficiently the analysis he would present in subsequent papers (Friedman. 1970 (Friedman. , 1972 . This is that. unless the interest elasticity of demand for money infinite. an increase in the quantity of money initially lowers interest rates at least slightly. This results in an increase in expenditures until prices have rken enough to bring the real quantity of money back to its previous level. And that requires as the quantity theory predicts. that prices have risen in proportion to the quantity of money. Only if the interest elasticity of demand for money is infinite, or if prices are Moreover, is Friedman correct in claiming that to have a coherent theory Keynesians must assume that the demand for money is infinitely elastic. so that Keynesian theory is a special case'! Instead. they can assume that. over the relevant horizon, prices are sticky. That is a common featurr of Keynesian models. Hence. Friedman should in this essay have tried to justify his unconventional readmg of Keynesian economics.
He does so in a subsequent lpaper (Friedman. 1971) . responding to Patinkin's (1972) criticism.
There he cites numerous passages from the Get~eral Theoiy in support. But it is doubtful that these support his clairn.I7 And even i.f in 1936 Keynes had assumed that the liquidity preference functior is infinitely elastic. this does not mean that Keynesian economists in 1956 did so too.l8 As already mentioned. Tobin (1947) explicitly identified Keynesian theory with any negative interest elasticity. And already in the early years of the Keynesian revolution when Brown (1993) and Kalecki (1940) Saying that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating" Friedrnan then discusses the empirical chapters of the book, which apply the quantity theory to various situations. Eugene Lerner explains intlation in the Confederacy, and Phillip Cagan explains hyperinflation. something that had previously been considered outside the scope of the quantity theory. And Richard Selden shows that velocity in the U.S. has been a stable function of a few variables over a long period. Only
German inflat~on during World War 11 resists a fi l y satisfactory explanation by the quantity theory, and that can be accounted for by the Draconian system of price control
Toward the end of the book Friedman makes a strong claim:
One of the chief reproaches directed at economics as an allegedly empirical science is that it can offer so few numerical "constants", that is that it has isolated so few fundamental regularities. 'The field of money is one of the chief examples one can offer in rebuttal: then: is perhaps no other empirical relation in economics that has been observed to recur so uniformly under so wide a variety of circumstances as the relation between substantial changes over short periods in the stock of money and in prices; the one is invariably linked with the other and is in the same direction: this uniformity is, I suspect, of the same order as many of the uniformities that form the basis of the physical sciences.
This passage provides the reader with powerful motive to reconsider the quantity theory. And given the prevailing Keynesian consensus such a powerful motive was needed, both because of the substantial effort required, and because of a natural reluctance to change one's mind. But subsequently it has been cited gleefully by Keynesians who point to the high monetary growth rate that accompanied the falling inflation rate of the 1980s. (See, for instance, Benjamin Friedman and Kenneth Kuttner, 1992.) Whether that experience really does invalidate the above passage depends on how one interprets the word "substantial". If Friedman meant with it an annual growth rate of.
say 20 percent. then it has yet to be disconfirmed. Friedman's statement s e e m startling and provocative. but is so vague that il: has little content.
Conclusion
The preponderance of a moderate Keynesian consensus in the 1950 shaped the way Friedman presented the case for the quantit:y theory. His primary task had to be to convince economists to reconsider this theory. This required an ecumenical presentation that would not drive off potential readers who were committed Keynesians. At the same time it required making some strong claims for the quantity theory to provide a sufficient incentive to reconsider it. A combination of "sweet reason" and shock tactics was needed. Friedman succeeded brilliantly in this rhetorical task. And he did so in way that made it hard for his opponznts to reasonably claim that he was employing "rhetoric" in the derogatory sense of the term. Nothing in his essay indicates that he followed Keynes (1924, p. 427 ) who tells 11s in his Treatise on Probabilio: "In writing a book of this kind the author must, if he is to put hi!; polnt of view clearly, pretend sometimes to a little nlore conviction than he feels. He must give his argument a chance, so to speak. not be too ready to depress its vitality with a wet cloud ot doubt." ENDNOTES *. I am indebted for helpful comrnents to Milton Friedman and Matthew Rafferty 1. In his 1970 paper Friedman tried to accommodate the demands of his critics that he state his implicit model by reformulating his analysis in an IS-LM framework. This framework is uncongenial to him since it takes prices as fixed (and hence does not distinguish between nominal and real interest rates). and because it assumes that money is a substitute only for bonds and not for commodities. Apart from that unsuccessful attempt to communicate with his critics Friedman added only two major theoretical element in his subsequent wr~tings on the quantity theory. One is the vertical Phillips curve. The other is that price flexibility ensures that changes in the nominal quantity of money do not lead to permanent or even long-run changes in the real quantity of money. (Friedman. 1968 (Friedman. , 1972 w a y is concerned with relating the demand for money, and hence the quantity theory, to the general theory of demand for durable goods;, and thus with "explaining". But the acid test to Friedman is whether the theory predicts sufficie:ntly well.
i.. This purpose is also served by the next paragraph in which Friedman writes that: "the quantity theory is in the first instance a theory of the demand for money. It is not a theory of output, or of rnoney income or the price level." (Friedman, 1956, p. 4) This passage probably surprised many readers (it certainly did me) and hence undermined the reader's belief that she already knew what the quantity theory is. Friedman's statement is correct because it is qualified by the phrase "in the flrst instance", but traditionally the quantity theory had been considered a theory of the price level or rnoney income. Johnson (1971, p. 10) points out that calling the quantity theory a theory of the demand for money shields it from tlhe criticism that it assumed that the economy automatically returns to full employment, "which was manifestly in conflict with the facts of experience." But the full employment assumption, while part of long-run classical theory, is not part, or at least not a prominent part of the quantity theory. The business cycles that Fisher (1922, Ch. 4 ) described showed unemployment that was consistent with experience.
L . Subsequently Friedman (1972) explained that he had in mind the policy recommendations of economists at the LSE in the 1930s. But neither of the two senior economists at the LSE was a cluantity theorist. Friedrich von Hayek (1931) devoted an entire chapter to a criticism of the quantity theory, while Lionel Robbins (1934) was also critical of a quantity-theory explanation of fluctuations. By contrast, leading quantity theorists, such as Irving Fisher and Clark Warburton advocated policies much more in line with Friedman's.
ft. That may seem contrary to Friedman's insistence on using the quantity of money instead of the rate of interest as the central variable. But Friedman does so for a practical reason, the difficulty of measuring the theoretical term "the rate of interest", and this is not relevant for the theoretical issues ciscussed in his essay. Friedman could also have obtained the main quantity-theory results by assuming more price flexibility than Keynesians did. 7. Nor is it the way Friedman thinks of it now. He now regrets his "ofhand comment" to Patinkin on the Keynesian origins of his theory, a comment resulting more from "friendliness and fundamental disinterest in origins as opposed to c'utcomes than any serious consideration of the origin of ideas." (Friedman, 1996) 7 . The Chicago school has a strong sense of loyalty E. Johnson (1971, p. 9) also writes that it helps to introduce old concepts under "confusing new tames", and cites as instances the substitution of permanent illcome for wealth, and the "dragg~ng across the trail of the red herring of human capital." But the term "permanent income" is sufficiently well explained by Friedman, and ecen if it might have been confusing in 1956 the publication of A Theory of rhe Consumption Function the next year made it familiar to economists. Nor does the concept of human capital seem confusing.
51.
For surveys of the literature on the interest elasticity of business investment see Meyer and Kuh (1963, pp. 340-41) and Eisner and Strotz (1963, pp. 227 and 232) . Studies of residential construction attributed substantially greater importance to the interest rate (see Grebler and Maisel, 1963. pp. 608-609) , but even so, this sector was not considered as interest sensitive then as it was later thought to be when Regulation Q became a serious constraint on intermediation. The response of consumption to interest rate changes was considered "negligible" (Suits, 1963, pp. 40-41) 10 . It is also possible that Friedman saw little benefit from phrasing his discussion in Keynesian language. Clark Warburton (1946) had used Keynesian language to present a quantity-theory criticism of Keynes~an theory on empirical grounds, and his paper was largely ignored. For a discussion of Warburton as a predecessor of Friedman see Cargill (1979) .
worked out in the more precise and detailed way that had become popular by the 1950s. Moreover. in the U.S. the transactions version predominated. For its time Pigou's (1917) exposition was extraordinarily sophisticated. He not only included in the cost of holding money expected inflation. but also made allowance for a m,oney substitute. ::ade credit, reducing the demand for money, as well as for lagged money holdings having a positive effect on current holdings.
12. The microfoundations that Friedman provided were not as elegant as those that Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) provided for the transactions demand, and Tobin (1958) for the speculative (or it is sometimes asserted the precautionary) demand. But while the Baumol-Tobin microfoundations are better suited for microeconomic work, Friedman's are better suited for macroeconomics with its greater emphasis on measurability (see Hammond, 1996a ) and prediction.
13. On the assumption that the ratio of human to nonhuman wealth is constant the possibility of switching between wealth and income is convenient for Friedman. Since he stresses the store-ofwealth function of money he should use wealth and not income as the budget constraint in his money demand function. But the available data do not measure wealth as accurately as income, and also it is changes in nominal income, not changes in wealth, that Friedman wants to explain.
14. Suppose the money supply increases by 10 percent, and that the real income elasticity of demand for money is 0.5. Ceteris paribus equilibrium requires a 10 percent rise in nominal income if real income is constant and only prices rise, but a 20 pqrcent rise in nominal income if prices are constant and only real income rises. For long rui~ analysis one can respond to this problem by claiming that over the long run ~memployment is at the natural rate so that real income is constant.
15. It is not clear how important this complicaticn is. To an academic economist concerned with predicting or explaining changes in nominal income it is very important. But a policy-maker is more likely to be concerned with predicting real income and prices separately than with predicting nominal Income.
16. The real bills doctrine (already found in the Wealth of Nations) stated that as long as banks issue bank notes or loans only to finance real (i.e. not speculative) activity they will not be issued to excess since the increased demand created by additional bank notes or loans will be met by an increased supply of goods and services. Any excess bank notes issued will be returned to the banks since the public will not want to hold them. The same is true for bank credit. Hence, as long as banks avoid lending for speculative activity the central bank should let the supply of money and bank credit expand or contract in acco~rdance with the demand for it.
17. For example. the first passage Friedman (1972. p. 945 , emphasis added) cites is: "Circumstances mav develop in which evm a large increase in the quantity of money may exert a comparatively small influence on the rate: of interest." First. "may" is not the same as "does". and more importantly "comparatively small" is not the same as "no".
18. In a subsequent paper (Friedman, 1964) wrote that many Keynesians now think that it is only seldom that liquidity preference is absolute.
